Mary Dejevsky writes:
The dramatic announcement that the French President and the German
Chancellor were on their way
to Kiev with a new diplomatic initiative which they intend to take on to Moscow
today was at once positive and negative.
It was
positive, because it was the first evidence for some time of a serious European
effort to address the intensified fighting in eastern Ukraine.
It was negative,
because it illustrated how bad the situation must have become to prompt a
mission that bears all the hallmarks of desperation.
Once the Hollande-Merkel
card has been played, it has been played. It is hard to know where anyone goes
from there, should this gambit fail.
There may be
several reasons why this move is being risked now.
The most obvious is the
renewed spread of fighting to the port of Mariupol, the threat of shelling and
street-fighting engulfing all of Donetsk, and the alarming deterioration in
conditions there even as winter hardens its grip.
A second would be
the stated intention of both Kiev and the rebels to increase their fighting
capacity, with appeals for volunteers and extended conscription – hardly a sign
that either side envisages peace.
But the third, and the one that renders
diplomacy so urgent, is the ever more frequent talk in some Western capitals
about supplying the Kiev government with weapons.
It should perhaps be noted that
– despite the great certainty with which some Nato representatives, but
especially the Kiev government, accuse Russia of supplying manpower and weapons
to the rebels - the position remains unclear.
Nor is it as one-sided as these
reports suggest. Eastern Ukraine is where many Soviet-era armaments factories
were sited.
There was weaponry aplenty in the region already without Russia
necessarily supplying more.
If Russia has regular troops in
eastern Ukraine, which it has denied, the numbers are not such as to have
allowed Nato or Washington to circulate definitive satellite photos to prove
it.
As President Putin pointed out months ago to the outgoing President of the
European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, Russia could reach Kiev in weeks – if
it wanted to.
This suggests that whatever its military involvement in eastern
Ukraine, it is – thus far – of a supportive/defensive, not
expansionist/offensive variety.
As for the Kiev government, Nato
– it would appear – is already providing support in matters such as
intelligence, satellite surveillance and training.
Defensive equipment, such as
helmets and other protective gear, is also finding its way to Kiev.
Polish officials
have claimed widespread popular support in their country for supplying
offensive, as well as defensive, equipment to Ukrainian forces; they have noted
the slenderness of the line that separates “offensive” from “defensive”, and
hinted at more active help should the Kiev government appear to be in danger.
Such talk is disturbing, as are
the signals coming from Washington.
Ashton Carter, President Obama’s nominee
for defence secretary (to succeed Chuck Hagel) told Senators that he was
“inclined” to provide the Kiev government with the heavy weapons it had been
asking for.
It must be hoped that such sentiments reflect the requirements of a
confirmation hearing before a majority Republican Congress and not the start of
a policy change in Washington.
But even words in this context are dangerous.
If
Russia believes that the US is preparing to supply heavy weapons to Kiev, you
do not have to be a strategic genius to forecast what might come next.
It would be premature – and
irresponsible – to write off the chances of diplomacy, even at this late stage.
But the ever-louder discussion of weapons-supplies only reinforces the idea of this conflict as a Cold-War style proxy conflict between East and West, in which all Ukraine is the prize.
And this is indeed how much of the West, especially the United States, has understood it almost from the start – with all the European flags on Kiev’s Maidan Square.
There is, however, another way of looking at it.
At ground level, this never needed to be an East-West conflict; nor should it have become one. It was – and remains – a struggle between two cultural outlooks and allegiances within Ukraine.
The westward orientation has grown – in strength and in geographical spread - in the almost quarter-century since the disintegration collapse of the Soviet Union, but the eastward orientation (represented by the misleadingly description of the forces in the east as “pro-Russian rebels”) remains.
The rebels’ initial demand for recognition within a genuinely federal Ukrainian state is still the optimal solution. It was enshrined in the various ceasefire agreements (which were accepted by Moscow) – but it has been consistently rejected by Kiev, which demands nothing short of a centralised state.
This is the real sticking point, and this is where the solution should be found: in a degree of federalisation that preserves the unity of Ukraine, while allaying the fears of those in the east that they will be dragooned into a way of life that they do not (yet) see as theirs.
Both sides have a point.
The violence in Kiev and Russia’s annexation of Crimea strengthened the pro-western tendency in Ukraine, but it also widened the cultural divide and exacerbated the feeling of vulnerability on the part of many in the east.
It could be argued that this divide and that vulnerability have now reached the point of no return.
The loss of largely pro-Russian Crimea has left Ukraine with its westward orientated majority increased as a proportion of the population.
If Kiev lacks the will, and the east lacks the trust, to keep Ukraine united, but as a federal state, the only alternative – to stop the fighting - might have to be an agreement to split.
Chancellor Merkel, for one, will adamantly oppose any new change of border in Europe; Kiev will resist for reasons of national dignity, but might be persuaded that peace, and an uncontested westward orientation, could be their own reward.
Russia has given no sign whatever that it wants to annex eastern Ukraine (and assume responsibility for rebuilding it), nor have Ukraine’s easterners asked at any point to join Russia.
There may come a time, however – if the Merkel-Hollande mission fails – where such an unpalatable option might have to be contemplated.
Either that, or the US, Poland and perhaps others start supplying weapons to Kiev, which would be a recipe for all-out war.
But the ever-louder discussion of weapons-supplies only reinforces the idea of this conflict as a Cold-War style proxy conflict between East and West, in which all Ukraine is the prize.
And this is indeed how much of the West, especially the United States, has understood it almost from the start – with all the European flags on Kiev’s Maidan Square.
There is, however, another way of looking at it.
At ground level, this never needed to be an East-West conflict; nor should it have become one. It was – and remains – a struggle between two cultural outlooks and allegiances within Ukraine.
The westward orientation has grown – in strength and in geographical spread - in the almost quarter-century since the disintegration collapse of the Soviet Union, but the eastward orientation (represented by the misleadingly description of the forces in the east as “pro-Russian rebels”) remains.
The rebels’ initial demand for recognition within a genuinely federal Ukrainian state is still the optimal solution. It was enshrined in the various ceasefire agreements (which were accepted by Moscow) – but it has been consistently rejected by Kiev, which demands nothing short of a centralised state.
This is the real sticking point, and this is where the solution should be found: in a degree of federalisation that preserves the unity of Ukraine, while allaying the fears of those in the east that they will be dragooned into a way of life that they do not (yet) see as theirs.
Both sides have a point.
The violence in Kiev and Russia’s annexation of Crimea strengthened the pro-western tendency in Ukraine, but it also widened the cultural divide and exacerbated the feeling of vulnerability on the part of many in the east.
It could be argued that this divide and that vulnerability have now reached the point of no return.
The loss of largely pro-Russian Crimea has left Ukraine with its westward orientated majority increased as a proportion of the population.
If Kiev lacks the will, and the east lacks the trust, to keep Ukraine united, but as a federal state, the only alternative – to stop the fighting - might have to be an agreement to split.
Chancellor Merkel, for one, will adamantly oppose any new change of border in Europe; Kiev will resist for reasons of national dignity, but might be persuaded that peace, and an uncontested westward orientation, could be their own reward.
Russia has given no sign whatever that it wants to annex eastern Ukraine (and assume responsibility for rebuilding it), nor have Ukraine’s easterners asked at any point to join Russia.
There may come a time, however – if the Merkel-Hollande mission fails – where such an unpalatable option might have to be contemplated.
Either that, or the US, Poland and perhaps others start supplying weapons to Kiev, which would be a recipe for all-out war.
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